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## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

## NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. ALSUP

AAOTTAE LOGGERVALE, et al,

Plaintiffs.

vs.

No. C 20-4679 WHA

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al,

Defendants.

) San Francisco, California

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

## **APPEARANCES:**

For Plaintiffs:

LAW OFFICE OF JOSEPH S. MAY

)

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May 11, 2023

1:30 p.m.

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(APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE)

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BY: KEVIN E. GILBERT, ESQ.

Also Present: Kristy van HERICK

- Assistant County Counsel

County of Alameda

## Thursday - May 11, 2023 1 1:45 p.m. 2 PROCEEDINGS ---000---3 Calling Civil Action 20-4679. Loggervale, THE CLERK: 4 5 et al versus County of Alameda, et al. 6 Counsel, please approach the podium and state your appearances for the record, beginning with counsel for 7 plaintiffs. 8 MR. MAY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Joseph May for 9 plaintiffs. 10 11 THE COURT: Welcome. MR. GEARINGER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 12 13 Gearinger. THE COURT: Welcome. 14 15 MR. PETERS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Craig Peters 16 on behalf of plaintiffs. 17 THE COURT: Welcome. MR. GILBERT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 18 19 Gilbert for defendants. 20 Also joined by Kristy van Herick from the County. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Herick, your position there is what? 22 MS. HERICK: I'm assistant county counsel. 23 **THE COURT:** Okay. Thank you for coming today. 24 25 seat, please.

All right. We're here on a motion for new trial and a motion for -- under Rule 50 after a verdict in favor of plaintiffs.

We can't possibly go through every issue here. I have one issue I want to bring up, and -- but I want to start with your issues. I'm going to give each side a chance to make one important point. Then we'll get a rebuttal. And then -- then the other side gets to make their most important point and then you get a rebuttal. And then, time permitting, I'm going to bring up the point that concerns me the most. And then you all get to respond.

So that will -- I don't know. That will probably take an hour, maybe more. And I have been studying the briefs quite a lot.

Okay. Since you are the moving party, Mr. Gilbert, you get to go first. What is your important point you would like to bring up?

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, we will be referencing --

THE COURT: If you can come up here, please.

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, are you referencing all the motions together? Individually? One specific?

THE COURT: All of them together. A lot of it overlaps, but I -- I feel like -- we can't relitigate everything. It's been relitigated in the briefs.

But for purpose of oral argument, I would like for you to

focus on one major point.

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, I think that the totality of the circumstances in the case is troubling and problematic, and focusing on one is difficult.

There are so many issues in this trial where there was incorrect statements of law, incorrect evidentiary rulings, incorrect conclusions and, in fact, judicial advocacy where we see time and again where they are perpetuated and they compound on each another.

For example, we started with totality of the circumstances, which is what the officers should have been allowed to introduce. The Court entered its own geographic limitations on what evidence within what proximity could be allowed, which was not what the officers actually considered.

The Court then precluded them from introducing other evidence.

And then on top of that it compounded the error by allowing plaintiffs to introduce evidence that was not known to the officers, which was not considered, which only became known after the incident. Once that compounded error was made and the incorrect evidence elicited submitted to the jury, the Jury Instructions and the issues in the case were then further complicated, and I believe there is error on those.

For example, Your Honor, there was points where the judge changed the instructions as we went through the proceedings,

and not only the instructions --

**THE COURT:** Say what?

MR. GILBERT: The instructions, as we went through proceedings progressed, as did the causes of action.

For example, the *Monell* claim was dismissed. There was an express ruling on that. It was dismissed. The parties proceeded through trial. The county defendants made their closing arguments.

Only after that point did the Court change the evidence -excuse me, change the standard in the case and add back in a

Monell claim and amended the verdict form after the jury had
been out, I believe it's either a day and a half or two days,
to add in a claim that was previously adjudicated and been
dismissed, which defendants had not focused on in evidence nor
in their closing arguments.

Then, to compound the matters even further, the Court introduced Jury Instructions that interjected the Court's personal opinion, advising the jury on what the Court found; that the Court believed certain things had happened, that certain constitutional violations had occurred.

But it wasn't just that the Court did that once. The Court not only included the instruction, but then it stopped and it repeated the instruction to emphasize that point to the jury.

Then when the jury had been out for at least two days, the

Court went one step further and it included that advocacy on 1 the verdict form and sent it into the jury room where the jury 2 was to read the Court's advocacy while it's in the room. 3 Now, Your Honor, the appearance -- whether the Court is 4 5 biased or an advocate is not the question. The question, as 6 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have stated, is: 7 "Whether the appearance of advocacy and whether the judge's remarks in questioning of witnesses 8 9 projected to the jury an appearance of advocacy or partiality." 10 11 Now, that is quoted Page 9 of our brief. Just focus on that one for a second. 12 THE COURT: 13 I wish I had the right document here, but I have it from 14 memory. 15 And I want your boss to listen carefully to this. 16 brief, Mr. Gilbert, you say that I engaged in judicial advocacy 17 by reading to the jury the statement that the search for the 18 daughter's I.D. was unconstitutional. It is true I read that 19 twice. You left out something very important in your brief. 20 21 you know what it was? 22 No, sir. MR. GILBERT: 23 Okay. All right. Here is what it was. THE COURT: Just before that, I had read twice that the search for the 24

driver's I.D. was constitutional.

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Now, this had been a heavily litigated point during the case, and I wanted the jury to have no doubt as to what the rule was under or Arturo D. with respect to the searches. And there was a search for the driver's I.D., which I said, in your favor, was lawful and I read that twice.

And then a few lines later I get to the daughter's I.D., and I had decided that was not constitutional and I read that twice.

Both times twice on an important point in the case so the jury would not be confused that one part of it favored you and one part of it favored the other side. This was for purposes of clarity.

Now, in your brief, and this -- I want your boss to know this, very characteristically of how you treated this case -- I have the whole list here -- of misrepresentations you've made to me and the jury in this case.

What you just said about me and judicial advocacy repeating it twice, it's a half-baked half story. You didn't put in the other half where I told the part that favored you and read it twice as well.

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Do you disagree that I read it twice on both sides of the coin?

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, I do not have the transcript, so I cannot agree or disagree right now. I will

happily look at it when I sit down.

My point is one step further. The comments about the list of comments, repeatedly the Court had questioned us on: Is this accurate? And the Court did not give us the opportunity to sit down and go through the issues and to give a full explanation.

For example, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Of what? Of what did I not give you a full chance to do?

MR. GILBERT: Whenever you questioned us on a specific issue, you would make accusations about it was half truth.

For example, there was an issue of the big five and there was a discussion about: Well, you told me in the offer of proof, counsel, that you were going to introduce X, Y and Z. That was true.

But what happened in between the time we presented the witness and that was the Court came in in subsequent days and amended its rulings and said: I'm excluding this or I'm limiting it.

So there was continual progression of issues where the Court would never give us the opportunity to set a full record.

And, in fact, the record is clear on that.

But turning back to the Court's reading instructions, it's not just the reading of the instructions twice. It's putting it on a verdict form and sending in to the jury room a specific

finding.

Now, the Court also referenced Arturo D. Arturo D. is very clear, Your Honor. And this goes to whether qualified immunity applies. A search of someone's identification --

THE COURT: Oh, no. The driver's identification. It says the driver. I've read it many times. It never says the passengers.

So it's another misrepresentation by Attorney Gilbert.

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, the Court of Appeal -excuse me, the appellate opinion in Arturo D. does not say that
it's limited to a driver. It says that the search for
someone's I.D. who is going to be cited is appropriate.

So, and then on top of that, we gave the Court the Wyoming case, where a passenger's presence was searched and where the United States Supreme Court found in Wyoming that that search was appropriate, which would be in harmony with Arturo D.

And as this circuit, the Ninth Circuit has held, Your Honor, in order to be clearly established there needs to be a case not necessarily factually identical, but so on point that every reasonable officer would understand what they are doing was unlawful.

And in this case, we asked plaintiff's own expert,

Mr. DeFoe, if it was trained and if a reasonable officer would

have believed that under those circumstances they could search

that vehicle for identification, including the trunk, and

Mr. DeFoe agreed.

That is a principle that every single law enforcement officer came in this courtroom and testified to, said that law enforcement would understand.

THE COURT: I wish I could believe you. When I go through the list, you'll see why I don't trust almost -- anything you say.

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor --

THE COURT: If you tell me things happened at the trial in black and white right now, I would be willing to bet ten dollars to one dollar what you told me is misleading.

I want to read to you what Arturo says itself. The question in Arturo was, quote:

"When a driver who has been detained for a citation, for a vehicle code infraction, fails to produce a vehicle code registration, et cetera, et cetera, the officer may conduct a warrantless search."

The "driver."

MR. GILBERT: In other words, when reasonable suspicion exists for a citation, the 148 citation, again, undisputed that the daughters admitted to refusing to get back into the car, to violating the directives from the deputies, Your Honor.

Now, going back to the discussions on the factual from

Mr. DeFoe. We've cited the evidence, his testimony, in the motion. It's available for the Court to read. The Court can read it.

It doesn't have to believe me or trust me. We've given the Court of evidentiary citation --

THE COURT: There's so many things -- when I finally do this order, I want your boss to read it, because there are so many things you said in your brief that turned out to be false. I'm going to flag as many as I can. I'm going to cite to the record. I'm going to do -- I'm going to do the -- so...

I don't want to get carried away here because I -- there are issues that you -- all right. I'm not going to try to -- I just want your boss to read it when it comes out.

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, we have --

**THE COURT:** Because the quality of -- no, not the quality.

What you have done to the Court is to have great disrespect for the Court and try to pull the wool over my eyes and make misrepresentations.

I'm going to tell your boss what -- when this case started on summary judgment, on summary -- now, this is not the trial, but this is -- this is where it started. We were on summary judgment and Mr. Gilbert almost had me persuaded. And he told me that Ms. Loggervale, when they rolled down the window, she -- and asked for the I.D., that she said that -- to the

officer -- now, this is all supposedly on tape. She said to 1 the officer, "I'm African-American and African-Americans don't 2 have to show their I.D." 3 Well, of course, that would make anybody mad to hear that. 4 5 Everybody has got to show their I.D. in the right circumstance. Being African-American, being white, being whatever, it doesn't 6 -- I said: That's unbelievable. 7 And then, I think it was Mr. May said: That never 8 9 happened. Now, I had a one side says yes, one side says no. 10 11 Mr. Gilbert stuck to his guns. Anyway, we went and got the videotape from the officers. It did not say that. 12 It did not 13 come close. Now, I almost was going to rule for Mr. Gilbert and grant 14 15 summary judgment because that -- that -- and he knew it would 16 make me mad to hear somebody say that because of their race, 17 they didn't have to comply with something. That's just -- no. 18 But Ms. Loggervale never said that. 19 Do you deny any of what I just said? 20 MR. GILBERT: Yes. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Your Honor, what I deny is that I would 22 MR. GILBERT: 23 misrepresent this Court intentionally. I misspoke on that. referenced a different piece of evidence that was inappropriate 24 25 in time and sequence and I made a mistake --

1 THE COURT: There was never anything in this whole 2 case that came close to that. But what you told me was way beyond the pale. 3 MR. GILBERT: Your Honor --4 5 How could you have possibly misspoken on THE COURT: that? 6 7 MR. GILBERT: If you want to sit down and spend the time to go through the other evidence where I can show you 8 where those comments and those type of information is in the 9 record, that's fine. But it was not from the driver. It was 10 11 not from the driver at that point. But the insinuation that I intentionally misrepresented 12 13 or --This has happened so many times, 14 THE COURT: 15 Mr. Gilbert. So many times. The order is going to lay them 16 all out. 17 I've got another thing I want your -- your -- this case, quite a large verdict was rendered in this case. 18 19 Ms. Loggervale and her two daughters were completely innocent, 20 completely innocent of any crime. 21 Now, I also understand the case from the point of view of the officers. They are out there trying to protect the public. 22 23 This case was tried by Mr. Gilbert without any apology, without even a statement of regret that a completely innocent 24 25 family was detained, handcuffed in the back of a car for 91

minutes. No statement of regret by the lawyer. No statement of regret by any of the officers. Completely innocent.

And Mr. Gilbert, in his closing argument -- in fact, during the trial itself in examining the witnesses, but it's represented best by the closing argument. He said: She lied about needing to go to the bathroom. She didn't go to the bathroom at the MacDonald's. She lied about that. What else is she lying about in this case?

So not only did the Loggervales, were they innocent and never got an apology and never got a statement of regret, they had to go through the third degree from Mr. Gilbert at the trial.

Now, I've -- for almost 50 years I either tried cases or I've done this job. It's quite clear to me that it was the way in which this case was tried that led to this big verdict.

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor --

THE COURT: If there had been a statement of regret, something like: You know, these guys were just trying to do their job. They made a mistake. We're sorry. Yes, they were -- yes, and we tried to explain that to them. Yes, we made a -- we made a mistake, ladies and gentlemen.

But that never came out. No. Mr. Gilbert said these police officers were right.

Now, the Court of Appeals could say: Mr. Gilbert, you're right. The judge misstated the law in some way. And if so,

that's fine. I -- I tried my best in a case where I got very 1 little help from the county. I got slightly more help from the 2 plaintiffs, but not -- only slightly more, and I had to do the 3 4 homework myself and my Law Clerk. I did the best I could with 5 these instructions. 6 MR. GILBERT: Your Honor --7 THE COURT: Wait. I'm not quite done. But the size of this verdict was Mr. Gilbert. 8 9 All right. Now you can speak. MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, the notion that -- I have 10 11 been appearing before Your Honor for over 20 years, almost 23 years at this point. If I have offended this Court or Your 12 13 Honor, I am truly sorry. THE COURT: Not me. 14 15 MR. GILBERT: But Your Honor has been holding it 16 against the county for what it perceives is my actions. 17 THE COURT: Your what? MR. GILBERT: Your Honor has been holding it against 18 19 the county for what it perceives is my actions. 20 No, no. I -- yes, I am in a way. THE COURT: a way, but -- but don't say that the jury couldn't hold it --21 22 the county hired you to come in and make these inflammatory 23 statements. The county hired you to come in here and call them liars. 24 25 MR. GILBERT: Your Honor --

And the jury can react to that. 1 THE COURT: That is evidence. And they can hold it against you. 2 MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, I met with one of the jurors 3 afterwards and spoke to them about the case. Their comment --4 5 that juror's comments to me were specific. 6 They did not agree with the Court's conclusion and Court's 7 language, but it felt that the Court's language told them they had to adopt plaintiff's position because the Court was so --8 THE COURT: I don't believe a word you're saying. 9 that under oath somewhere? 10 11 MR. GILBERT: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: I don't believe -- if this was some other 12 13 lawyer that I could trust, I might believe you. But I don't believe what you're telling me. 14 15 MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, look at how long the jury 16 was out, and it was only after the Court wrote in and said on 17 the verdict form: I want to remind you they violated the 18 Constitution. 19 If this was such an easy case and I enraged the jury, this 20 would have been a very fast verdict. But it was only when the 21 Court changed the rules, changed the verdict form and added causes of action in that it went back, your Honor. 22 23 THE COURT: All right. I am going to -- all of those points that you have made, you have misrepresented how it came 24

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down.

I'm going to -- I have gone to a lot of trouble, it's 1 going to be a long order, to set forth the true record. 2 Because on appeal, I believe you will do the same thing to the 3 Court of Appeals that you have done to me, which is 4 5 misrepresent the record, just like you've done today, and they 6 -- and I'm going to have an order that blows that out of the 7 water. I'm going to say to the Court, maybe I've got this wrong. 8 Maybe there are some issues that I got wrong. That's okay. 9 Ι 10 don't mind being reversed for that. But I don't want to be 11 reversed for something where I am -- I did it right and you have misrepresented the record. 12 13 All right. I've heard your point. All right. What does the plaintiff want to say? What's 14 15 your main point. 16 THE COURT REPORTER: Counsel, please state your name 17 for the record. 18 Yes. Joseph May for the plaintiffs. MR. MAY: Your Honor, would you like me to rebut or respond to the 19 20 defense? 21 You get a rebuttal, that's right. THE COURT: Yes. As I said you did. Go ahead, you get a rebuttal. 22 23 MR. MAY: And I will be fairly brief. The points Mr. Gilbert raised are largely in the papers. 24 All right. Give me one good point though. 25 THE COURT:

Please help me out here. Explain why it's not true.

MR. MAY: As to the claim that the Court excluded relevant evidence on reasonable suspicion, this seemed to be one of the first points the defense made, and they seemed to brief it extensively.

They point -- well, first of all, they don't identify where the Court actually excluded the evidence. The only thing I recall, and I scoured the record as well, is the Court did exclude evidence regarding auto burglaries that were about three miles away from the subject incident. That would be at 15600 Hesperian Boulevard in San Lorenzo, California.

And I just want to point out the defense cited to

Exhibit A to their opposition to plaintiff's first Motion in

Limine. Mr. Gilbert prepared his own table where he said we

have 11 other incidents and we could only rely on two. That

was one of their misrepresentations in the papers.

There aren't 11 incidents. There are several that are the same incident, just with different descriptors.

Most of these are at the subject lotion, 2720 Castro Valley Boulevard, which they've never been prohibited from referencing during the trial and, in fact, they extensively discussed the prior auto burglaries there.

15600 Hesperian Boulevard, they list three incidents.

Only two were properly produced in discovery. And not only are those three miles away, one of them had no victim -- or, sorry.

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Yeah, no suspect identified whatsoever. So that's unhelpful to
 1
     their claim. Even if it was admitted, it wouldn't do any good.
 2
          One of them was black male adult 25 to 40 years old,
 3
     5 foot 5 with face tattoos, and along with a heavyset black
 4
 5
     female with blue twisted hair driving an SUV, not a sedan.
 6
     that was back in May, more than four and a half months prior to
     the subject --
 7
              THE COURT: How far away was that one?
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 9
              MR. MAY:
                        Three miles away.
          So this is what they are complaining about; that they
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     should have been able to bring in evidence about these
     burglaries that had nothing to do with our case.
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                                                        It wouldn't
13
     have helped them --
                          And they weren't in the -- or were they,
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              THE COURT:
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     in Officer Holland's -- Deputy Holland's report, same-day
16
     report?
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              MR. MAY:
                        That's correct.
                                         The only thing he listed in
     the report for this incident were the other burglaries --
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              THE COURT: Six, I think.
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              MR. MAY: -- at the subject location, was all he
21
     referenced in his report.
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              THE COURT: I thought he had some that were nearby,
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     but not --
                              No, sir. No, sir.
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              MR. MAY:
                         No.
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              THE COURT:
                          All right.
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MR. MAY: So that's -- I mean, I could go on and on.

But I think the papers, we set forth --

THE COURT: Well, I -- thank you. I want you to know I've gone back to -- I'm going to set forth the real record here.

Here is the argument Mr. Gilbert made. They were only allowed to discuss two -- count them, one, two -- two prior incidents at Starbucks parking lots within a mile of the subject incident. And so -- and those were the two the day before and the day before that at the very same location.

Well, that's actually not true. They were allowed to discuss those two, but they were allowed to discuss a lot more.

Now, on the very same day of the incident, Deputy Holland went back to his office and he wrote a pretty good memo. And he said: Here is why I did it. And there were six prior events, and all six of those came into evidence. All six of them came into evidence.

And, in fact, the underlying police report for those I allowed into evidence as well, and then -- but there was more. There was more.

And so what happened was that Mr. Gilbert asked Officer
Holland about other incidents beyond that, but being vague
about where they were. Actually, those got into evidence, too,
without objection.

So there was that. There was also the six. And at some

point under Rule 403 it becomes cumulative -- not cumulative, 1 but it becomes so lengthy and non-probative that I -- what good 2 does it do to prove, okay, there was a seventh, an eighth and a 3 ninth months earlier three miles away, whenever we've got six 4 5 very close by, at the very same Starbucks. At some point you 6 have to say -- it's got to be a very powerful showing for 7 something that remote in time. That's what I ruled. any judge would have ruled that. 8 And -- but no. Mr. Gilbert says he was only allowed to 9

And -- but no. Mr. Gilbert says he was only allowed to discuss two prior incidents. It's just not true.

And I -- it -- because he's talking about -- it upsets me that somebody would put in writing and take up to the Court of Appeals that I just allowed two. And it's just not true. It's just not true.

All right. So --

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MR. MAY: I'm sorry. Just to follow that up.

It wasn't just the incidents at Castro Valley Starbucks.

This is from Pope's testimony, Page 913, Lines 11 through 13 of the trial transcript.

Sergeant Pope testified:

"ANSWER: The part that I remembered was that we were having auto burglaries, typically early in the morning, oftentimes at Starbucks. And it wasn't just one Starbucks, because I have Starbucks in my sector also, and they would be, like, a smash and grab," end

quote.

So not only were they not limited. They went ahead and they asked their witnesses about other locations as well.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. What did you want to bring up that would be your most grievous point, if you have one.

THE COURT REPORTER: Counsel, please state your name again.

MR. PETERS: Thank you. Craig Peters appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Your Honor, I don't know if it's our biggest point, but it's actually in reaction to something you mentioned just earlier today.

You mentioned that this was a big verdict, I think is the word you used, "big." And I guess what we want to talk to the Court about is how --

THE COURT: I don't think you should get into your jury survey. That's attorney -- otherwise I -- I'm going to let them take your deposition and get into all of the work product. I think it was wrong for you to bring that up.

It's -- you gave me a selective look inside what your jury consultant did, and the jury -- by all rights I ought to let them take the deposition of the -- and find out all the rest of the stuff. So that was -- that was out of line for you to selectively waive your work product.

Now, it may be that if you want to cite to other big 1 verdicts, that's okay. But to cite to something in your own 2 work product behind the scenes, I don't know. I'm not going to 3 4 place any weight on that. If that's what you were about to get 5 into, I want to head it off. MR. PETERS: It wasn't, but it's good to know the 6 Court's opinion on that. 7 My concern is more with the Court's characterization of 8 the verdict as "big." I have real concerns about that. I 9 10 think that this is a fair and reasonable --I don't need to call it "big." I'm not 11 THE COURT: going to -- I don't need to call it "big" in my order, but I 12 will call it by what -- it's 7.5 million or whatever it comes 13 out to be. And how did the -- how did the jury get there? 14 15 I think the Court of Appeals will think of it as large. 16 And I think most of the judges on my court think of it as 17 large. 18 So, and can you tell me some comparable verdicts for 91 19 minutes of detention? 20 MR. PETERS: Well, that would be pretty disappointing 21 if most people on the bench think that this verdict is somehow 22 large for the facts. Every case is tried on its own individual facts and as 23 this Court is well aware, having presided over jury trials and 24

having tried cases yourself, all the facts are different.

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Every single one.

THE COURT: That's true. That's very true.

MR. PETERS: And time matters. What time we're in socially, economically, politically, that matters, too. That matters in the way in which we evaluate things.

And I point out to this Court that until very recently this very state, the State of California, often considered a very liberal state that tries to protect people who have historically been disenfranchised and marginalized, until very recently allowed past economic data by disenfranchised and marginalized groups to be used in jury trials to establish their lost wages.

Said slightly differently, a Hispanic woman who was injured, the defense could come in and talk about the historical data for Hispanic women to try and establish economic loss. Why is that wrong?

THE COURT: Of course I can see that argument, but what's that got to do with this case?

MR. PETERS: Because what Courts have frequently done is they've looked at the relationship between economic damages and non-economic damages in determining whether they think the non-economic damages are appropriate or not. That's wrong.

And that's wrong because if we look historically backwards in time at verdicts, the Court has endorsed the systemic racism that's been part of our system because we take people who have

been disenfranchised and marginalized. We know that they have earned lower wages. They've had fewer housing opportunities, employment opportunities. The whole panoply. Medical opportunities for that matter; right?

We've taken that and now we have put it into the system

and said not only are we going to reduce your economic damages, but now we're going to look at a proportionality between economic damages and non-economic damages to potentially reduce your non-economic damages as well. Essentially they are punished twice for something that is race based, gender based, other discriminatory basis.

THE COURT: Well, all right. I'm thinking -- I see your point. That's a good point, and I have sympathy to that.

But even if this had been three white women, this verdict, I think, most judges would think of as large.

MR. PETERS: And I'm sorry for that, because I think what it does is it undervalues the power of systemic racism.

And to the extent that the Court that we have now said that we don't think that systemic racism and specifically how the Loggervales experienced that in this case is such that it is --

THE COURT: That's not true. That is not true. What you're saying is just wrong. That's a jury speech.

This Court does sympathize with African-Americans and what they've been subjected to and the systemic problems in America.

It's wrong for you to say that. But the law -- look at it. 1 Think of it. What would be --2 Is the Court's position that if this was MR. PETERS: 3 three white women, that they should get the same exact award? 4 5 Because if that's the Court's position --6 THE COURT: No, that's not my position. 7 MR. PETERS: Okay. My position is that regardless of who the 8 THE COURT: people are involved, even African-Americans, even white people, 9 10 this is a large verdict. And in my view, the reason it's a 11 large verdict is the way Mr. Gilbert tried the case and not because of what actually happened. 12 13 However, in your defense, what he -- how he tried the case is part of what they were subjected to. They not only had to 14 15 go through insult -- injury, but they went through insult 16 through this trial. They were insulted throughout the trial by 17 Mr. Gilbert and the way he treated them. And I think the jury could take that into account. That is what accounts for the 18

large verdict, in my humble opinion.

However, I don't have to say that to -- in an order. But that's -- that is the way I feel and that's what I want the county to know, is that my own humble opinion from trying 50 years' worth of cases is -- that's what I believe happened here.

All right. I don't want to hear any more jury speeches.

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Please.

All right. Time is short. I want to raise the point that bothers me the most here, and that concerns the Bane Act. Now, I want to start by saying there was no objection made to that part of the Jury Instructions. Zero. So maybe that's the short answer and that's the end of it.

But here is what I think happened. I think the jury -and they could have done this. They could have said: All
right. We can treble damages and so -- or quadruple damages,
according to plaintiff, and, therefore, they found damages more
in the range of 400,000. Do the math. I haven't done it. And
then they trebled it.

Well -- or 600,000 and then they trebled it, or quadrupled it.

If the law is that that's a penalty and the Supreme Court has held that you have to have guidelines for the jury when you -- when they impose a penalty, otherwise it's a taking without due process of law, then the -- we didn't give them any of those guidelines in how to exercise their discretion, which would have happened if they had gone to the punitive damages phase. So I'm troubled -- I'm troubled that I didn't do that.

Now, in my defense nobody had an objection to the way those were worded, and you had from that Friday all the way through Monday. Other points were raised, but that -- that particular point was not raised. And I -- so they -- maybe the

easy answer is: Okay, it wasn't raised. End of story.

It's complicated further by the fact that this statute is just one of the worst pieces of trying to piece it together

I've ever seen in the California -- so you've got 52.1. That's the Bane Act. And it refers to damages that you can award under, let me see, Section 52. Not limited to damages under Section 52.

All right. So then you come to what does Section 52 say? Well, Section 52(a) is the one that says -- adds up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage.

But the actual lead-in to it says: Whoever denies, aids, incites a denial or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, 51.5 or 51.6, is liable for...

So it doesn't pick up 51-point -- 52.1, which is the Bane Act.

Now, this piece I think we did discuss before, but I'm revisiting it. And then 52-point -- 52(b) has punitive damages, but does not have the treble damages. But even it says: Whoever denies the right provided by 51.7 or 51.9 or aids or conspires is liable.

So which is it that should apply to the Bane Act? Is it 52(a) or 52(b)? Well, if you were strictly going by how it's written, none of them do because 52.1 is not mentioned in 52(a) or (b).

However, to go back to the Bane Act, it does mention -- it

says Section 52. So which one is it (a) or (b)?

Well, then you come to this -- and this is one place I'm going to say, Mr. Gilbert, you were of assistance to the Court in responding to that order that I sent out asking for more briefing. You pointed out that the legislative history in 1991 has the following statement in the amendment in 1991:

"This bill would delete the award of three times the amount of actual damages and instead would provide merely for an award of exemplary damages. The bill would increase a civil penalty 25,000."

That was for 52 -- I'm sorry. 52(b), I believe. So they are deleting -- '91, it was deleted. Treble damages were deleted from one part, but not for the other.

And -- and I can't -- what I'm still struggling with is in 1991 what did the legislature intend and what did it say it intended with respect to which one the Bane Act would fit under?

So, again, I'm going to let you start, Mr. Gilbert, and then I'll hear from the plaintiffs. 52 -- my question is: In the legislative history of the amendment in 1991, there was a deletion of treble damages and a -- but allowing for exemplary damages. But was that the one that the Bane Act applied to?

So I -- I would like for you -- to give you a chance to check with what happened in '91 and help me understand the -- that sequence of events.

Actually, you can help me with something else that even 1 precedes that. Before this amendment, which part of the -- how 2 did it read in the Bane Act? Maybe the Bane Act read 3 differently then so I could -- it would make more sense to me. 4 5 Do you have the actual language of the Bane Act prior to this 6 amendment? 7 MR. GILBERT: I do not have it, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, if --8 MR. GILBERT: I'm trying to pull it up --9 If you can pull it up, that would be 10 THE COURT: 11 great. But come on up here and tell me -- what can you say that 12 would definitively help me sort out this legislative history? 13 MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, we have nothing further to 14 15 add to what was in the briefing, the legislative intent. 16 The legislative intent is very clear on the intent of 17 deleting these provisions and then --THE COURT: Well, where is the Bane Act mentioned in 18 19 any of the legislative history? 20 I'm sorry? MR. GILBERT: 21 The Bane Act, 52.1, where is that actually THE COURT: 22 mentioned anywhere in this legislative history? 23 MR. GILBERT: I thought it was discussed in concept, and then it says about the amendment when you look at the 24 25 entirety of the legislative history, Your Honor.

Well --1 THE COURT: 2 MR. GILBERT: The statutes are very clear. 52 and 52.1 are two different statutes. The language has been 3 4 We can see the legislative intent in removing it and 5 saying the trebling of whatever the damages are are absolutely 6 being stricken from the Bane Act. You can see in the statute language --7 THE COURT: Where does it say that? Where does it 8 9 call out Bane Act and says we're removing the trebling? MR. GILBERT: It's the -- we've shown the specific 10 11 legislative intent, Your Honor. I believe we gave it to the And I don't have copies --12 13 THE COURT: Help me find -- you did give me something. I have too many pieces of paper up here now. 14 15 (Brief pause.) 16 THE COURT: All right. Now, I'm going to read from what you've said. And it goes part of the way toward what 17 18 you're saying, but it doesn't go as far. 19 I'm reading from your brief, Page 3. 20 "The legislative counsel's digest accompanying 21 the bill explained the changes in a series of numbered 22 The explanation for these two changes 23 appears in clauses three and four." And I'll read number three: 24 25 "Under existing law, i.e." -- now, this is

something you inserted -- "i.e. Section 52(b)" before 1 the amendment." 2 Then continuing: 3 "All persons within this state have the right to 4 5 be free from any violence committed against their persons or property because of their race, color, 6 7 religion ancestry, et cetera, et cetera. Existing law provides that whoever denies, et cetera, et cetera, is 8 liable for each and every offense for actual damages 9 suffered, and, in addition, an amount to be determined 10 11 by the trier of fact up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damages, et cetera." 12 And then the -- skipping slightly ahead: 13 "Under existing law in the case of multiple 14 15 offenders, the \$10,000 penalty is prorated." 16 Then in -- then you put it in in italics. I don't think 17 it's in italics in the original, but that doesn't matter. "This bill would delete the award of three times 18 the amount of actual damages and instead provide 19 20 merely for an award of exemplary damages." 21 So, yes, but that's talking about 52(b). 22 Now, where -- what I'm trying to figure out is, okay, does 23 the Bane Act tie in to 52(b) or 52(a)? And did it -- and before the amendment, did it tie into 52(b) or 52(a)? 24 25 me with that part.

MR. GILBERT: So, Your Honor, part of your question is if there is an amendment, I believe, after what we've shown here, that I don't have in front of me.

The purpose of showing this was the purpose of showing that there was a specific legislative intent to remove the trebling because the 52.1 in its entirety is the Bane Act. And then you have the different subsections that address who can prosecute, what the scope of the damages are.

So there has been a progression of that. And that's what we are showing through the earlier amendment of the specific legislative intention of removing the trebling of the damages.

There is discussion of exemplary damages, but I believe -no. There's an amendment -- unfortunately, I don't have it
here today -- that may have removed it. I can't speak to it
intelligently today.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GILBERT: I can tell you the current language -THE COURT: Do you know any case law? Does it tell
us -- even under the very current law, there's one section,

(a), that -- that allows for trebling to be amended and one
section (b) which does not. So --

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, I can tell you --

THE COURT: Does the Bane Act apply, invoke (b) or does it invoke (a)? It says both -- neither of them -- both of them call out some sections, but none of them are the Bane Act.

1 And so is there case law that tells us, do we use (a) or 2 do we use (b)? Well, Your Honor, I think you need to MR. GILBERT: 3 look at the statute by itself because (a) is just the name of 4 5 the statute. (B) is if -- who can bring a cause of action and that 6 authorizes the City Attorney, Attorney General and so on. 7 (c) is a different section that allows a private 8 9 individual to prosecute a claim. So each of them specifically has a right to action, who 10 11 can prosecute it, and what the remedies are under that specific So each of them is very clear and self contained. 12 And I think going one step further, looking at how the 13 judicial counsel of the State of California interpreted it 14 15 in the -- the approved CACI instructions are very clear that 16 there is not treble damages awarded or competence compensable 17 on this issue. THE COURT: Just a minute. 18 (Brief pause.) 19 Well, (c), as is now written: 20 THE COURT: 21 "...creates a private right of action by the Attorney General, District Attorney, City Attorney, or 22 23 any person agreed by the conduct may bring a civil action in an appropriate court." 24 And then: 25

"The Complaint shall list the following," and it 1 does. 2 MR. GEARINGER: (b) and (c) --3 THE COURT: Wait a minute. Let me finish. Thinking 4 5 out loud. 6 All right. (d) gives the right to intervene. 7 (c) says: "Any individual that has been interfered with may 8 institute, prosecute in their own name and on their 9 own behalf a civil action for damages, including but 10 11 not limited to damages under Section 52. Injunctive relief and any other appropriate equitable relief to 12 protect the peaceable exercise, " et cetera. 13 You can file that in Superior Court. 14 15 But what I'm not seeing is, where does it say you get 16 the benefit -- it does say under -- "damages under Section 52," but we have two different provisions under 52, one with 17 18 trebling, one without. 19 So how do we know which one it is? 20 MR. GILBERT: Because, Your Honor, if you read 51, 51 21 expressly says in Subsection (a) the --22 THE COURT: 51 or 52.1? 23 MR. GILBERT: 52. THE COURT: Point 1. 24 52 specifically starts out and 25 MR. GILBERT: No.

1 says: "Whoever denies, aid or incites a denial or makes 2 any discrimination or distinction contrary to" -- and 3 then it lists out the statutes -- "is liable..." 4 5 It goes through. And under 52 every paragraph goes 6 through and says the specific statute it applies to. It self limits. It does not ever reference 52.1 as being 7 applicable --8 Well, then what is -- what is 52.1(c) 9 THE COURT: referring to when it says "damages under Section 52"? 10 11 MR. GILBERT: Damages under Section 52, Your Honor. But then you have the injunctive relief. You have the 12 attorney's fees. And you have the \$25,000 penalty, which would 13 14 be applicable potentially. 15 But, Your Honor, when you look at the legislative intent and you look at the plain language of 52, 52 does not invoke or 16 17 apply by its own terms to 52.1. 18 THE COURT: It doesn't by its own terms, correct, but 19 it does refer to Section 52. And Section 52, in turn, has two 20 different -- overlapping, but two different provisions. this particular case it makes a difference as to which one we 21 22 should have applied. And that is, to me -- it has to apply to one or the other. But neither of them are called out. 23 calls out other statutes. 24 25 MR. GILBERT: That's where we interpret the

legislative intent with the specific intent of removing the 1 treble damages and the language that confirms that treble 2 damages are not compensable against a public entity. 3 THE COURT: Is there case law that addresses this 4 5 conundrum? The answer is none that we can find 6 MR. GILBERT: because when we looked at California law and the CACI Jury 7 Instructions, it's very clear that under CACI it does not 8 believe that there is treble damages under the Bane Act. 9 THE COURT: Well, I don't remember the -- do you have 10 11 the CACI right here? MR. GILBERT: No, Your Honor, I don't. But I can pull 12 13 it up. THE COURT: I don't remember that detailed point now. 14 15 But CACI is not law, by the way. CACI is just a bunch of 16 lawyers, a committee that comes up with instructions and that 17 are proposed. They are not the law. MR. GILBERT: But they are adopted and approved by the 18 19 judicial council, Your Honor. 20 Well, be that as it may, it's still not THE COURT: 21 the law. MR. GILBERT: CACI number 3066 is the instructional 22 elements. And then 3035 is the verdict form. 23 **THE COURT:** What does it say about trebling? 24 25 MR. GILBERT: There is no reference to trebling in the

1	CACI instructions.
2	THE COURT: In either of them.
3	All right. Let's see if the plaintiff's can help me.
4	MR. MAY: Thank you, Your Honor. Joseph May again.
5	Since we're on the CACI, we cited this to the Court. This
6	is the verdict form. The verdict form itself doesn't have room
7	for trebling, but the directions for use specifically address
8	the question that Your Honor has been struggling with.
9	And I just want to point out, this is appellate court
10	judges, trial court judges on a committee to do their best
11	THE COURT: I used to be on committees like that and
12	that's why I know it's not the law.
13	MR. MAY: It's not the law, but
14	THE COURT: It's almost the law.
15	MR. MAY: We cited a Ninth Circuit case that says it's
16	persuasive. So it's not binding, but Courts should consider
17	it.
18	THE COURT: That's the way I view it.
19	MR. MAY: It can be helpful.
20	THE COURT: What does the comment say?
21	MR. MAY: Okay.
22	"Neither subsection of Section 52 mentions the
23	Bane Act or Civil Code Section 52.1. Nevertheless the
24	the Bane Act refers to Section 52. See Civil Code
25	Section 52.1(c). This reference would seem to

1	indicate that damages may be recovered under both
2	Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 52."
3	And I think that's the better approach, and I'll tell
4	you why
5	THE COURT: (a) and (b)?
6	MR. MAY: Well, it says "damages available under 52."
7	It doesn't limit it to (a) or (b). I think that the most
8	logical reading is all of them. Whatever is under 52, you get
9	it because it's referenced in the Bane Act.
10	Why wouldn't they say only (a) or only (b)?
11	THE COURT: Well, then what was the reference to
12	eliminating treble damages in the '91 what was that?
13	MR. MAY: Happy to explain, because Your Honor was
14	wondering what did the previous version say.
15	THE COURT: Yeah.
16	MR. MAY: Right.
17	So what happened in 1991 was that the Subsection (b)
18	that I think that applies to the Ralph Act. It's California
19	Civil Code Section 51.7 and 51.9 claims.
20	They said: You're no longer going to get treble damages
21	acknowledge we're going to increase the penalty to \$25,000.
22	At the same exact time in the same legislative session,
23	the legislature also amended the Bane Act, Section 52.1, to add
24	the reference to Section 52.
25	So the same legislature that said: If you win on the Bane

Act, you get damages under 52, also did some -- some 1 reconfiguring inside of 52. 2 But they must have had knowledge that they are pointing 3 4 the reader to another statute; right? 5 THE COURT: But before -- before the amendment, the --6 the Bane Act did exist. It came around in the 80's. 7 MR. MAY: Yeah. The Bane Act didn't say: You also get damages under 52. It just was the damages listed in 52.1 8 itself. 9 I think -- I could be wrong. I think back then it also 10 11 didn't -- at some point I don't think it applied to bright citizens, I think that was added maybe before '91. 12 13 different things have changed. THE COURT: In your brief did you point all this out? 14 15 MR. MAY: Most of it. 16 THE COURT: I'm interested in what it was like prior 17 to the amendment. Did you point that out? 18 MR. MAY: No. Can you -- can you submit something to me 19 THE COURT: 20 today or tomorrow that lays that out? 21 How about the CACI instructions? Did you point that out? We cited it. Throughout the case we've been 22 MR. MAY: 23 citing this instruction. THE COURT: So what I hear you saying is that the Bane 24 25 Act, where it says "including but not limited to damages under

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Section 52," the reference to "Section 52" was not in there
 1
    prior to '91. It had its own damages.
 2
                                         That's correct.
              MR. MAY:
                        That's correct.
                                                          It added
 3
     the reference to 52, at the same time that it took away the
 4
 5
     treble damages from 52(b) and upped the penalty to $25,000.
 6
          There is also -- we did cite cases, by the way. There are
     cases that -- they don't do the analysis that we're currently
 7
     doing, but they said:
 8
               "The Bane Act allows for recovery of actual
 9
          damages and treble damages."
10
11
          That's Ninth Circuit case Klein versus City of Laguna
     Beach, we cited. 810 F.3d --
12
                          Wasn't -- I read that back when we were
13
              THE COURT:
     doing this. It seemed to me to be tentative and conditional or
14
15
     assumed arguendo. I can't -- is that right or not? What am I
16
     remembering?
17
              MR. MAY:
                       That I don't know. It was a footnote and I
     don't have all the facts of that case. But, you know,
18
19
     California -- it was the California statute.
20
          We've got California Court of Appeal cases Grassilli
21
     versus Barr, 142 Cal. App. 4th, 1216 --
              THE COURT: Tell me this. What does -- okay.
22
23
     cite those in your brief?
                       They're all in the brief.
24
              MR. MAY:
25
              THE COURT:
                          All right. I have a different question.
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51, 51.5, 51.6, which are where the treble damages are 1 expressly authorized, what do those sections deal with? 2 MR. MAY: No idea. No idea, Your Honor. But the 3 legislature clearly only wanted some prevailing parties on some 4 5 statutes to get some damages. They are saying if you prevail 6 on these, you're going to get these damages. If you prevail on 7 those, you're going to get those damages. And if you prevail on 52.1, you get everything under 52, or else they would have 8 9 limited it in some way. And that's what the CACI counsel said, and that's -- I 10 11 think that's why we have the --THE COURT: I --12 13 MR. MAY: Here is the thing. We've never seen a case -- I've never heard an argument that you don't get treble 14 15 damages under the Bane Act, quite frankly, and I've been doing 16 Bane Act cases many, many years. I've spoken at the Consumer 17 Attorneys of California on the Bane Act. I've probably filed 18 more Bane Act cases in state court than anybody I know. 19 I've never heard the argument you don't get treble damages 20 under the Bane act. Every case says you do, and there's not a 21 single case that says you don't. 22 Sorry for speaking so fast. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Gilbert, is that true? Every case 24 says you do and no case says you don't?

MR. GILBERT:

No, Your Honor.

25

1 THE COURT: It's true or -- I'm sorry. It's not true? I don't agree with that statement. 2 MR. GILBERT: THE COURT: Have you given me the authorities that say 3 4 you don't get treble damages? 5 MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, we've given you the 6 legislative intent. We've given you the cases that address it. And we note that in none of the cases that have addressed 7 treble damages was the question of whether they were properly 8 compensable or available was ever adjudicated. 9 And we've also given the Court a legal discussion that 10 11 issues that are not raised or briefed for adjudication in a published case are not law and are not precedential. 12 13 So the fact that a party may not have objected to the issuance of treble damages or may not have challenged it as 14 15 being legal or appropriate does not mean that any Court has ever adjudicated that it was lawful and appropriate. 16 17 we found no authority whatsoever that has ever resolved or 18 addressed this issue, Your Honor. 19 And as to one quick other point --20 Okay. But help me out here while I've got THE COURT: 21 you. 22 Do you have the -- do you have the code book there Look. 23 right now? Let's just -- tell me what 51 is, Section 51. That's the Unruh Act, I believe. 24 MR. MAY: 25 THE COURT: All right. And that deals with race

1	discrimination; right?
2	MR. MAY: Right. In places of public accommodation.
3	You can't discriminate
4	THE COURT: All right. 51.5, what does it deal with?
5	MR. MAY: Business discrimination.
6	"No business establishment of any kind whatsoever
7	shall discriminate against, boycott, blacklist or
8	refuse to buy from, contract with, sell to or trade
9	with any person in the state on account of any
10	characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or
11	(e) of Section 51."
12	It goes on. It sounds like a counterpart to 1981.
13	THE COURT: So that's an extension of Unruh.
14	51.6, what is that?
15	MR. MAY: Prohibits this is a summary. Let me pull
16	up the actual statute.
17	Okay. Apparently, gender discrimination.
18	"This section shall be known and may be cited as
19	the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995."
20	Subsection (b):
21	"No business establishment of any kind whatsoever
22	may discriminate with respect to the price charged for
23	services of similar or like kind against a person
24	because a person's gender."
25	And it goes on.

1	THE COURT: Okay. What is 51.7 and 51.9?
2	MR. MAY: 51.7 is the Ralph Act. That has to do with
3	violence based on somebody's protected class. We initially had
4	a Ralph Act claim in this case and abandoned it at some point.
5	If you want
6	THE COURT: Ralph what?
7	MR. MAY: Ralph Act.
8	THE COURT: So that's violence based on race?
9	MR. MAY: Protected class.
10	THE COURT: Well, that would include race.
11	MR. MAY: Including race.
12	THE COURT: All right. What is 51.9?
13	MR. MAY: Subsection (a):
14	"A person is liable in a cause of action for
15	sexual harassment under this section when the
16	plaintiff proves all of the following elements."
17	It's a long list of elements, if the Court wants all of
18	them. It sounds like it's a sexual harassment civil action.
19	THE COURT: I'm sorry. I was reading it. Repeat what
20	you just said.
21	MR. MAY: 51.9 has to do with it provides a right
22	of action for a sexual harassment civil claim, and it lists the
23	elements. I can read the whole thing if the Court wants.
24	THE COURT: Read to me again what the CACI instruction
25	says.

1	MR. MAY: The directions for use?
2	THE COURT: Yeah.
3	MR. MAY: Yeah. Okay.
4	"Neither subsection of Section 52 mentions the
5	Bane Act or Civil Code Section 52.1. Nevertheless,
6	the Bane Act refers to Section 52. See Civil Code
7	Section 52.1(c). This reference would seem to
8	indicate that damages may be recovered under both
9	Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 52."
10	And then it goes on.
11	Right after that it says:
12	"The Court should compute the damage under
13	Section 52(a) by multiplying the actual damages by
14	three and awarding \$4,000 if the amount is less."
15	THE COURT: So you treble actuals to the maximum or
16	you can quadruple?
17	MR. MAY: Again, the Bane Act says you get actual
18	damages and an award up to three times.
19	THE COURT: I know, but you were reading the the
20	guide. What does it what does the note say?
21	MR. MAY: It says this yeah. It says well,
22	right before that it says:
23	"This reference would indicate damages may be
24	recovered under both Subsections (a) and (b). The
25	Court should compute the damages under Section 52(a)"

-- so the treble portion -- "by multiplying actual 1 2 damages by three." THE COURT: All right. Are you adding in a word or 3 two or did you read it exactly? 4 5 Read that sentence exactly. MR. MAY: Okay. And I quote: 6 7 "The Court should compute the damages under Section 52(a) by multiplying actual damages by three 8 and awarding \$4,000 if the amount is less." 9 I just want to point out, though, that 52(a) is the treble 10 11 damage thing. So damages plus treble. And before --12 THE COURT: 13 Wait, wait. That's a minor point in this case, whether it's quadrupled or trebled. 14 15 You know, when you get to be as old as I am, you realize 16 that trebling is the maximum under many statutes, starting with 17 the Sherman Act, and the -- the idea of quadrupling is 18 something out of step with that. So I -- that's what gives me pause on that, but that's a 19 minor issue in the scheme of things here. 20 21 MR. MAY: Could I address? The Court raised something else just now as a concern, which is that there might be some 22 23 criteria that are required. Because if this is punitive, then we need to give the jury criteria. 24 And we cited some cases in our brief. This is the most 25

recent brief in reply to the defense brief. 1 THE COURT: 2 Yeah. MR. MAY: But there are cases here. This is Overnight 3 4 Motor Transportation Company versus Missel, which is 5 M-I-S-S-E-L, 316 U.S. 572. It's a 1942 case. 6 superseded by statute. I think because of this holding the 7 Congress amended the statute. But the case held that the version of the Fair Labor 8 Standards Act then in effect -- and there was a provision 9 awarding employees double damages for unpaid overtime without 10 11 any regard to whether it was good faith or reasonable by the employer to withhold the wages. And they said that's not a 12 13 violation of due process. THE COURT: Well, that would not be that. That would 14 15 Nor would trebling under the Sherman Act be because you don't -- under the Sherman Act it's automatically three 16 17 times. Because. 18 MR. MAY: Aqain --19 THE COURT: In our case it's up to. 20 MR. MAY: Right. 21 So there's discretion by the jury. THE COURT: And 22 the Supreme Court has said that where there is discretion by 23 the jury on a punitive, you're supposed to give them quidelines. 24 25 Now, but in a trebling under the Sherman Act, there's no

discretion that that -- if it's a million dollars in actuals, 1 you get 3 million automatically. It's statutorily required. 2 So I -- and the doubling thing is the same thing. 3 familiar with that concept. 4 5 MR. MAY: Right. And we have other cases, but I think they also apply to statutes that have an automatic trebling. 6 But I don't know that the rationale would be much different. 7 So the jury has discretion. There's still going to be up to 8 three -- there's notice. 9 You know, we cited a Ninth Circuit case that says the 10 defendant's notice of the fact that there's a statute like this 11 gives them some due process protection. 12 13 They know that if they act really poorly and take away somebody's right through threat, intimidation or coercion, they 14 15 are facing up to three times. It could be less. You know, 16 that's in their favor, but it could be three times. 17 THE COURT: All right. This has helped me some. 18 Thank you. 19 I am most of the way through writing an order, but I 20 haven't finished it. And I -- I need to do this while it's 21 fresh in my memory. I need to get an order out. 22 But tell me -- I don't want to know any of the substance. 23 I just want to know time-wise when is the earliest you -- you

24

25

say you're mediating this with the -- with somebody and -- but

then I didn't like to hear that mid-June date. That sounds too

far out.

So what -- where does that part stand?

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, we met with the Court of Appeal. The defendants offered to mediate, said they are willing. Plaintiffs indicated they were not interested, so the Court of Appeal has released us from the mediation program and there is nothing scheduled.

THE COURT: So there's no program going? I thought you said did you want to mediate.

MR. MAY: Yeah. There's more to the story.

The reason we ultimately said we don't want to schedule it now with the Ninth Circuit is because the defendant said they wouldn't even have somebody with authority until at least mid June, which, to me, would suggest a July mediation date. And we wanted -- we would rather have a ruling on these motions.

THE COURT: I can't wait until July. I would love to see you settle this case, but if I wait til July, at my age I will not be able to do a responsible job. I'm sorry, I can't just wait that long. I will do a responsible job now and in the next few weeks, but that's too long.

So I should have referred you both to a magistrate judge back whenever I wanted to do that, and then a magistrate judge would have been effective in getting -- and you, Mr. May, were the one that talked me out of that, saying, no, you wanted to go to the Ninth Circuit. Now that's slipped away from me too.

It wouldn't have mattered. They don't have 1 MR. MAY: 2 somebody who can put any money on the table. Well, the county could do it. That's just THE COURT: 3 a -- that's just a -- I don't know. That's not a good reason. 4 5 What? MR. PETERS: So we shouldn't believe them? They told 6 7 us that they couldn't. THE COURT: No, no. You should -- if they refuse to 8 But I know from other cases if the county wanted to, if 9 it really turned on it, they could make -- move things faster. 10 11 They could. I believe that that's what they told you. 12 MR. PETERS: No. THE COURT: 13 I'm not denying that they told you that. You're too sensitive. You take offense at things that 14 15 were not intended in an offense. 16 MR. PETERS: We have constantly tried to accommodate, 17 but there is a point at which we have to take them at their And when they say: We can't do anything until July. 18 word. 19 Unless the new people here say something differently, in which 20 case we're happy to change our position. But I just -- it just 21 feels like --All right. Okay. Okay. I don't want to 22 THE COURT: 23 get in the middle that. MR. GILBERT: To be really clear --24 25 THE COURT: If I was in your position, I would try to

settle this case within the next couple weeks. 1 MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, I want to be really clear. 2 Mr. Peters was not on the scheduling call, nor was Mr. May. 3 The assessment call with the Court of Appeal was Mr. Gearinger 4 5 and Mr. Gearinger alone on behalf of the plaintiffs. If they appeared, then I don't remember -- actually, were 6 7 you on the phone? I was on the call, Your Honor. 8 MR. MAY: 9 MR. GILBERT: Okay, I'm sorry. But Mr. Peters was absolutely not. 10 11 Was that you --THE COURT: Was that what you said, that you couldn't 12 13 do it til mid July or mid June? MR. GILBERT: 14 No. We explained the timing of the 15 approvals process. We explained that the best result would be 16 to do it late June. 17 The mediator from the Ninth Circuit indicated that he would make sure and schedule someone with priority to have it 18 19 done during that time period. They scheduled a further follow-up call with plaintiff's 20 counsel. The report that came back from the Court of Appeal 21 22 was that plaintiff's counsel indicated that they do not have a 23 desire to sit down and participate in a mediation. Well, I see probably what happened here, 24 THE COURT: 25 and I'm not going to point any fingers at the -- if the

plaintiffs say that's too late, I can understand that.

If they -- if it was a matter of a couple weeks, I would say they should wait a couple weeks. But waiting a -- a month and a half is -- is -- and you know that would be the soonest.

Now, if I was the county, I would make things happen faster, but I -- and if you told me you could -- you hold up two weeks and there's a 50/50 chance you would have a deal, I would hold up. But I am not going to hold up a month. I will have an order out within a month, maybe sooner. So as soon as I can get it ready.

I'm in a big trial right now. I don't have much time to work on this case, but I will starting in about -- I am working on it. You know, about 5:00 a.m. every morning. 5:00 a.m.

I'm in here, and my dedicated Law Clerk comes in at 6:00 o'clock. And then I go into the trial at 7:30.

So I am working on your case, but I can't work on it as fast as I would like to work on it because I've got other things to do.

All right, my friends. I believe -- I believe I've got everything. Thank you, and motions are under submission.

MR. MAY: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. GILBERT: Your Honor, that --

THE COURT: There was something you were going to give me, but I've forgotten. Please give it to me, not now, but send it to me by tomorrow. I've forgotten what it was now.

1	MR. MAY: Thank you.
2	THE COURT: Thank you.
3	(Proceedings adjourned.)
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## CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

## Llewa X. Pard

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Debra L. Pas, CSR 11916, CRR, RMR, RPR
Tuesday, May 16, 2023